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Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts:
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and
Federal Climate Policy
DAVID M. COOLEY & JONAS J. MONAST *
I.

INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of federal legislation proposed in recent
years to address climate change has included a market-based capand-trade system to limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
Examples of cap-and-trade bills proposed or introduced in the
111th Congress include the American Power Act (APA) proposed
by Senators John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman, 1 the American
Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), sponsored by
Representatives Henry Waxman and Ed Markey and passed by
the House of Representatives in 2009, 2 and the Clean Energy
Jobs and American Power Act, sponsored by Senators John Kerry
and Barbara Boxer and passed by the Senate Environment and
Works Committee in December 2009. 3 Each of these bills would

* The authors would like to thank Margaret S. Davis and Nadia L. Luhr for
their assistance with research and drafting.
1. See American Power Act, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). Discussion draft
2010,
available
at
http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/APAbill3.pdf
(hereinafter APA).
2. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
3. See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong.
(2009). Other examples of recent federal cap-and-trade bills include The Clean
Energy Partnerships Act, S. 2729, 111th Cong. (2009); The Carbon Limits and
Energy for America's Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877, 111th Cong. (2009), and
two bills introduced in the 110th Congress: The Climate Security Act, S. 2191,
110th Cong. (2007); The Low Carbon Security Act, S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007).
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set a limit on the overall amount of GHG emissions allowed in the
United States (the “cap”), distribute emission allowances
representing the equivalent of one ton of carbon dioxide, and
require entities covered by the program to submit allowances at
the end of each compliance period for each ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO 2 e) emitted. The allowances would be fungible and
trading among covered entities and other market participants
would be permitted. 4
Under each of these bills, regulated entities can also satisfy
compliance obligations by purchasing GHG offset credits—
verified GHG emissions reductions made by entities that do not
face GHG compliance obligations under a cap-and-trade system,
such entities in the agriculture and forestry sectors. Both ACES
and the APA, for example, allow regulated entities to use up to 2
billion tons of CO 2 e 5 of offsets annually, split between domestic
and international offsets projects. 6 Offsets play a key role in
reducing the overall cost of GHG regulations and achieving
reductions in uncapped sectors.
The cost containment aspects work in two ways. First,
offsets projects, especially those involving land use activities, are
often less expensive to implement than emissions reductions by
regulated entities. Second, in a market-based program with a
strict cap on emissions, offset credits from uncapped sectors
create an option for increasing the supply of compliance

4. While most recent cap-and-trade bills would allow unrestricted market
participation, the CLEAR Act and the APA include limitations on who may
trade allowances and related derivative instruments. See S. 2877 § 4(b); APA §
2411.
5. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recognizes 6 greenhouse
gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride
(SF6). In order to compare emissions of different greenhouse gases, each of
which have a different potential to warm the atmosphere, each gas is given a
carbon dioxide equivalent based on its global warming potential. See
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499 n. 4 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. chap. 1).
6. In ACES, there is an even split between international and domestic
offsets; the annual limit on each is 1 billion tons. See H.R. 2454 § 722(d)(1). In
the APA, regulated entities can use a total of 1.5 billion tons of domestic offsets
and 0.5 international offsets each year. See APA § 722(d)(1).
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instruments. 7 Economic modeling demonstrates the effect of
offsets in an economy-wide cap-and-trade system. For example,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s modeling results for
the APA found that without access to offset credits from
international projects, the cost of allowances could more than
double. 8 In addition, because eligibility to produce offsets is
limited to sectors that are not covered by GHG reduction
regulations, offsets can provide opportunities to reduce emissions
in unregulated sectors. 9 In order to meet the demand for these
credits, an offsets program involving projects in the agriculture
and forestry sectors will necessarily rely on participation from
many thousands of private landowners and offsets project
developers.
Allowing unregulated entities to voluntarily
participate in the program, and thus earn income by selling
credits, could increase political support and spread the economic
benefits of the program.
A federal agency would be responsible for creating
methodologies for ensuring that an offset credit actually
represents the equivalent of one ton of either avoided emissions
or sequestration of CO 2 . 10 Because offsets can be susceptible to
certain environmental integrity issues, these methodologies
would have to address such issues as additionality, leakage, and
permanence. Additionality means that the offsets project must
lead to sequestration or emission reductions that would otherwise
not have occurred but for the project. Leakage refers to the
possibility that emissions displaced by a project will occur
7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
SUPPLEMENTAL EPA ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY
ACT OF 2009: H.R. 2454 IN THE 111TH Congress 3 (2009) (which found that
disallowing international GHG offsets could increase allowance prices by 89
percent).
8. OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS
OF THE AMERICAN POWER ACT IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 53 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/EPA_APA_
Analysis_6-1410.pdf.
9. For example, the agriculture sector is responsible for 6 percent of US
GHG emissions. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2007 ES-12 (2009). The agriculture sector would not
be regulated under ACES. See H.R. 2454 § 501(b).
10. See H.R. 2454 § 734; APA § 735 (for more information on requirements
for methodologies).
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elsewhere; for example an offsets project where a forest is spared
logging could drive logging elsewhere to satisfy demand for
timber products, reducing the environmental benefits of the
offsets project. Permanence refers to the fact that some offsets
projects, specifically agriculture and forestry sequestration
projects, can be vulnerable to an intentional or unintentional
release of their carbon, possibly through fire, drought, or pest
infestations. 11
The implementation of an offsets program, however, could be
significantly affected by existing environmental laws, most
notably, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 12 and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). 13
Both are longstanding
environmental laws that, among other things, establish
procedures to assess the environmental impacts of federal
actions. In many ways, these statutes are the cornerstones of
modern environmental law, providing information about
environmental impacts and available alternatives, and allowing
citizens to directly challenge federal agencies’ compliance with
the laws. They have also been the subject of significant criticism
over the years, as compliance can be costly, expensive, and can
lead to lengthy legal challenges.
If the federal agency managing a carbon offsets program is
required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
under NEPA or consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the
ESA before implementing the offsets program or before approving
individual offsets projects, the program could face lengthy delays.
Delays in project approval and increased transaction costs from
complying with these laws could potentially discourage private
landowners and project developers from participating in the
offsets market, reducing the overall supply of offset credits.
Policymakers may need to strike a balance that achieves the

11. See generally Brian C. Murray, Brent Sohngen, & Martin T. Ross,
Economic Consequences of Consideration of Permanence, Leakage, and
Additionality for Soil Carbon Sequestration Projects, 80 CLIMATIC CHANGE 127
(2007) (for a more complete explanation of additionality, leakage, and
permanence).
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370H (2006).
13. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
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goals of NEPA and the ESA, while also streamlining the
regulatory process for developing and approving offsets projects.
Although the 111th Congress did not succeed in passing
comprehensive climate change legislation, a carbon offsets
program would almost certainly be included in future legislation.
The purpose of this article is to examine how compliance with
NEPA and the ESA could affect a federal GHG offsets program,
both through the establishment of the program itself and through
the permitting and approval of individual offsets projects. This
information could help policymakers in designing future
legislation for carbon offsets and the regulation of GHG
emissions.
II. BACKGROUND ON GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS
Examples of GHG offsets projects include carbon
sequestration in soils through reduced agricultural tillage and in
forests through tree planting projects. Because the forestry and
agriculture sector are not included under the GHG emissions
cap, 14 offsets can provide an opportunity to incentivize GHG
emissions reductions in these uncapped sectors. Furthermore,
because offsets increase the overall supply of credits regulated
entities can use for compliance, offsets can reduce the costs of
complying with GHG regulations.
Analysis of the offsets provisions of the GHG regulation bills
introduced in the 111th Congress 15 reveals key differences in the
legislative language that has implications for how NEPA or the
ESA might affect an offsets program. Among the most significant
differences in each approach is whether the offsets program is
established under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 16 This is only
relevant with regard to NEPA, because actions taken under the

14. In ACES, the forestry and agriculture sectors are explicitly excluded from
the cap. See H.R. 2454 § 501(b). In the APA these sectors are implicitly
excluded, because they do not fall within the definition of “covered entity.” See
APA § 700(12).
15. Unless otherwise noted, the GHG regulation bills discussed in this paper
from the 111th Congress refer to ACES and the APA.
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).

5

01 COOLEYMACROFINAL

382

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

3/23/2011 6:16 PM

[Vol. 28

CAA are exempt from complying with NEPA. 17 This distinction
is less important for compliance with the ESA, as a similar
exemption for actions taken under the CAA does not exist for the
ESA. The differences between an approach under the CAA and
other approaches are discussed below.
A. Establishment of an offsets program under the Clean
Air Act
There are two potential approaches to establishing an offsets
program under the CAA. The first is for Congress to amend the
CAA to establish an offsets program for GHG emissions. The
APA follows this approach, including the entire cap-and-trade
program and offsets provisions under a new title in the CAA. In
ACES, the language establishing the offsets program is divided
into two parts: one part establishes a program for offsets from
agricultural and forestry sources, administered by the USDA, 18
and the other sets up a program for offsets from all other sources,
administered by the EPA. 19 Importantly, however, the language
establishing the USDA offsets program is not included under the
CAA, and so it would not be exempt from NEPA. 20
Although the APA similarly gives the USDA authority over
agricultural and forestry offsets and the EPA authority over all

17. “No action taken under the Clean Act shall be deemed a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the
meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” 15 U.S.C. §
793(c)(1) (2006).
18. See H.R. 2454 §§ 501-511.
19. See id. §§ 731-743.
20. In the debate leading up to the passage of ACES, there was some
discussion over the role that the USDA would play in the offsets program,
particularly concerning offsets from agricultural and forestry projects. In an
agreement reached between Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Rep. Collin Peterson, Chairman of
the House Committee on Agriculture, the USDA was given total exclusive
responsibility over agricultural and forestry offsets. See Letter from
Representative Henry Waxman, Chairman of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, and Representative Collin Peterson, Chairman of the House Comm.
on Agric. to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (June 24, 2009), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/ Press_111/20090629/acespresidentletter.pdf.
See also Allison Winter, Farm Groups Prevail as House Puts USDA in Charge of
Ag Offsets, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009.
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other offsets, it does not split the legislative language into two
parts. 21 Language establishing both offsets programs is amended
to the CAA, and in this case both offsets programs would be
exempt from NEPA. 22
The second approach to establishing an offsets program
under the CAA is for the EPA to use its existing authority under
the CAA as currently written to regulate GHGs.
In
Massachusetts v. EPA, 23 the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA
had the authority to regulate GHGs from mobile sources, and the
responsibility to do so if it determined that those GHGs
endangered public health or welfare. Shortly after that ruling,
the EPA issued an “endangerment finding” for GHGs, 24 which is
one of the first steps in promulgating new regulations for air
pollutants from mobile sources. 25
Although this process has clarified the EPA’s authority to
regulate GHGs, it is less evident whether the EPA also has
existing authority under the CAA to establish a GHG offsets
program. There is some research suggesting that the EPA might
not have existing authority under the CAA to allow use of
international offsets for compliance with GHG regulations, but
domestic offsets might be allowed. 26 Indeed, the CAA already
includes the concept of offsets for use in meeting existing air
quality regulations, 27 so it is possible that similar provisions

21. See APA §§ 731-743.
22. ACES has passed the House of Representatives, whereas the APA was
not introduced in the Senate in the 111th Congress. If the APA were to pass the
Senate, this and other differences between the bills would need to be addressed
in conference committee.
23. Massachusetts. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
24. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,496.
25. The endangerment finding issued by the EPA was applicable only to
mobile sources. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006) (for language on establishing
emissions standards for pollutants from mobiles sources expected to endanger
public health). Once GHGs have been determined to endanger public health,
the Administrator can also establish emissions standards for stationary sources.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006).
26. See generally, Nathan Richardson, International Greenhouse Gas Offsets
Under the Clean Air Act (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper, 2010).
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (the New Source Review program of the
CAA, which allows new air pollution sources to be constructed in areas already
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could be used to allow offsets under new GHG regulations.
Regardless, however, the CAA is still exempt from NEPA, so such
offsets under CAA regulation would not be affected. Again, the
ESA would still apply since actions taken under the CAA are not
exempt from its requirements.
B. Establishment of an offsets program outside of the
Clean Air Act
Other legislative approaches to regulating GHGs have not
involved amendments to the CAA. These include the Clean
Energy Partnerships Act, 28 a bill dealing specifically with offsets,
as well as climate legislation proposed in previous Congresses,
such as the Climate Security Act. 29 These approaches would not
automatically exempt by statute an offsets program from the
requirements of NEPA (or the ESA).
The following sections assume that a federal GHG offsets
program is not exempt by statute from either NEPA or the
ESA. 30 Furthermore, because proposals before Congress differ as
to which agency would have authority over the offsets program,
this paper refers generically to “the implementing agency” or
simply “the agency.”
III. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
NEPA is first and foremost an informational statute, in that
it requires federal agencies to assess the impacts of “major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 31 Adopted in 1969, NEPA provided the foundation
for modern environmental laws by requiring federal agencies to
assess the environmental impacts of their actions and creating
above established pollution limits only if the new source obtains pollution
reductions, or offsets, from existing sources in the area).
28. S. 2729.
29. S. 2191.
30. At the very least, this assumption is valid for the offsets program
administered by the USDA under ACES. It could also apply to a future climate
bill, if language creating an offsets program by such a bill is not amended to the
CAA.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the White
House to guide agencies and promulgate regulations for NEPA
The law has been a model for similar
implementation. 32
legislation in 25 states 33 and more than 160 countries. 34 As the
Supreme Court stated in 1989:
Simply by focusing the agency’s attention on the environmental
consequences of a proposed project, NEPA ensures that
important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only
to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die
otherwise cast. . . . Publication of an [Environmental Impact
Statement] . . . also serves a larger informational role. It gives
the public the assurance that the agency ‘has indeed considered
environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process,’ . . . and,
perhaps more significantly, provides a springboard for public
comment . . . 35

Agencies need only to demonstrate that they have considered
the potential environmental impacts of proposed actions; they
need not necessarily choose the option with the least
environmental impact. 36 In addition to the CAA exemption
described above, NEPA allows agencies to create categorical
exemptions, does not apply where compliance would be
inconsistent with statutory requirements, and is not required if
another statute serves as the functional equivalent of NEPA. 37
Nevertheless, complying with NEPA can be a timeconsuming process.
When an action with potential
environmental impacts is proposed, the agency will generally first
32. Id. § 4341.
33. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 3 (1997).
34. See Nicholas A. Robinson, NEPA at 40: International Dimensions, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. 10674, 10674 (2009).
35. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)
(citing Balt. Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983)) (holding that although NEPA imposes procedural duties that force
agencies to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences, the statute does
not impose substantive requirements).
36. See id. at 350 (stating that once procedural rules are followed, the agency
can weigh costs/benefits and is not required by NEPA to choose the least
environmentally-damaging option).
37. These exemptions are discussed in detail in section III(B) below.
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complete an Environmental Assessment (EA), 38 which is intended
to be a “concise public document” 39 that allows the agency to
determine if it needs to prepare a full Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS). If the agency determines that the proposed
action will not have enough impact to merit preparing an EIS, it
will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). 40 At this
point, the agency has fully complied with the NEPA
requirements, and it may move forward with its proposed action.
If, however, the agency determines that the environmental
impacts of the proposed action are significant, it must prepare an
EIS. An EIS is a lengthy technical document, often hundreds of
pages long, in which the agency considers the impacts of the
proposed action, as well as all relevant alternatives to the action,
including the alternative of no action. 41 In the process of
preparing an EIS, the agency must first publish a notice in the
Federal Register of its intent to prepare an EIS, referred to as
“scoping.” 42 Then, after gathering technical information on the
proposed action and relevant alternatives, the agency issues a
draft EIS for public comment. 43 Finally, after responding to all
comments received on the draft EIS, the agency issues a final
EIS, 44 and a record of decision explaining the agency’s rationale
for proceeding with its action. The considerable cost and time
required to gather and analyze information on the impacts of all
relevant policy alternatives can lead to significant delays in
agency action. 45
In the case of complex programs with many individual
projects, the agency can choose to prepare a “programmatic EIS,”

38. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2010) (for more information on the
preparation of an EA). For projects that have been predetermined to have no
significant impact on the environment, and for those projects that belong to
predetermined categories that always require an EIS, EAs are not prepared.
39. Id. § 1508.9.
40. See id. § 1508.13.
41. See id. § 1502 (for regulations concerning the preparation of an EIS).
42. Id. § 1501.7.
43. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a).
44. See id. § 1502.9(b).
45. It can often take a year or more to complete an EIS. See NEPA’s Forty
ON
ENVTL.
QUALITY,
Most
Asked
Questions,
COUNCIL
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/40p3.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
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which analyzes the environmental impacts of an entire program.
The agency may then also prepare subsequent EAs or EISs for its
individual projects to analyze their site-specific impacts. 46
Regardless of the agency’s decision to prepare an EIS,
however, NEPA requirements can expose an agency to litigation
by parties claiming either that an EIS was not prepared when it
should have been or, if an EIS is prepared, that it is inadequate,
omits important alternatives, or misstates potential impacts.
A. Impacts of NEPA on a Federal GHG Offsets Program
As mentioned above, actions taken under the Clean Air Act
are not considered major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, and are therefore
exempted from NEPA requirements. 47 Although the EPA offsets
program in ACES and the entire offsets program in the APA are
amended to the CAA, the USDA offsets program in ACES is not,
leaving it subject to NEPA.
Furthermore, should a
comprehensive climate bill fail to pass the 111th Congress, future
climate bills may not follow the same template of amendments to
the CAA. Therefore this paper assumes that the offsets program
is not exempt by statue from NEPA.
The NEPA requirements could potentially affect the
implementation an offsets program on multiple levels. First, the
implementing agency must establish offsets methodologies, or
rules that private parties use to develop offsets projects, including
the rate at which projects earn offset credits and information on
the monitoring and verification of offsets projects. 48 Once the
methodologies have been established and landowners begin
developing projects, the agency must issue approval for qualified
offsets projects 49 and certify verified offset credits. 50
46. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & S. FLA WATER MGMT. DIST., FINAL
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: FLORIDA KEYS WATER
QUALITY
IMPROVEMENTS
PROGRAM
10
(2004),
available
at
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/projects/project_docs/other_projects_fkwqip/f
kwq_eis_main_body_cover_figures.pdf (covers the entire program, but
subsequent EAs or EISs are required for individual projects).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1).
48. H.R. 2454 § 504(a)(1).
49. See id. § 505(c).
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Each of these actions by the implementing agency may
individually qualify as a major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment and, therefore,
may require the preparation of an EIS before the action could
take place unless an exemption applies. 51 Preparing an EIS for
the offsets methodologies could lead to delays in initial
investment in offsets projects, as project developers must wait
until the final rules are issued. 52
A requirement to prepare an EIS before approving each
individual offsets project, however, could lead to considerable
delays in the approval of projects and certification of credits,
especially considering that thousands of projects would likely be
necessary to meet the demand for offset credits. CEQ regulations
also allow agencies to require the applicant (in this case the
offsets project developer) to pay for the cost of preparing the
These delays and added costs could discourage
EIS. 53
participation by landowners and project developers, which could
reduce the supply of offset credits and diminish their potential to
contain the cost of GHG regulation.
To determine whether an EIS is necessary for any of these
actions, we explore whether each action in implementing a GHG
offsets program qualifies as a major Federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.

50. See id. § 507.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). See also Calverton Cliffs Coordinating Comm.
v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating
that an EIS must be completed before the agency implements the proposed
action).
52. See LYDIA OLANDER ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS,
POLICY OPTIONS FOR TRANSITIONING FROM VOLUNTARY TO FEDERAL OFFSETS
MARKETS 3 (2009) (for more information on issues concerning investment
uncertainty for initial offsets projects).
53. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c). See also NEPA’s Forty Most Asked Questions,
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/ 40p3.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011)(explaining that references to “third party contracts” in
CEQ regulations refers to the preparation of an EIS by contractors paid by the
applicant).
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Major Federal action

Regulations concerning NEPA drafted by the CEQ state that
“‘Major Federal action includes actions with effects that may be
major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and
responsibility.” 54 This includes the “[a]doption of programs, such
as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or
plan,” 55 and the “[a]pproval of specific projects. . .by permit or
other regulatory decision[s] . . . .” 56 A Federal agency developing
offsets methodologies would certainly qualify as a major Federal
action under this definition.
Although individual offsets projects would be developed by
private parties, their approval and the certification of their
credits by the implementing agency could also be considered a
Federal action. However, the courts have been split concerning
situations in which Federal involvement is limited only to the
approval or permitting of an otherwise private project. In some
cases, the courts have allowed agencies to consider only the
impacts of actions over which they exert control, and not the
impacts of connected actions by private entities. For example, in
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 57 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit upheld an EIS prepared by U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) that considered the environmental impacts
from only the portion of an electrical transmission line for which
a river-crossing permit was required by the Corps and not the
impacts from the rest of the transmission line.
In the Ninth Circuit, however, courts have generally required
the agency to include all environmental impacts from the action,
including those from private actions that would not have occurred
but for Federal agency approval. 58
54. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18.
55. Id. § 1508.18(b)(3).
56. Id. § 1508.18(b)(4).
57. See Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1980).
See also Save the Bay Inc., v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.
1980) (the Corps of Engineers needed only to consider the impacts from
permitting a pipeline to a DuPont chemical plant and not the impacts of the
plant itself).
58. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976) (the
court required the Bonneville Power Administration to consider the impacts of a
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In the case of an offsets program, individual projects clearly
would not be able to move forward without Federal approval. In
fact, both ACES and the APA require that projects be considered
additional, or in other words that they would not have occurred
in the absence of the offsets program. 59 Therefore it seems likely
that both the development of offsets methodologies and the
approval of projects would qualify as Federal actions.
Whether those actions qualify as “major” is more ambiguous.
CEQ regulations state that the word “[m]ajor reinforces but does
not have a meaning independent of significantly.” 60 The courts
have generally resisted agency attempts at narrow
interpretations of “major” in the context of NEPA, holding that
any action with significant impacts should be considered a major
action. 61 Therefore, it seems that determination of actions in
reference to the implementation and administration of an offsets
program as “major actions” will depend on the significance of
their impacts.

privately-constructed Alcoa magnesium plant where the federal agency
contracted to construct the transmission line to the plant and supply it with
power, “federaliz[ing] the entire project”); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758
(9th Cir. 1985) (the court required the USDA Forest Service to consider both the
impacts of a federally-constructed logging road and the impacts of the private
logging activities that would result from the construction of the road).
59. See H.R. 2454 § 734(a)(1); APA § 735(a)(2) (2010) (for information on
additionality requirements for the offsets program).
60. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. Federal courts are split on this issue. Some cases
differentiate between “significant” and “major,” saying that “major” could refer
to things like cost, planning and time. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640,
644 (2d Cir. 1972).
61. See generally Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314
(8th Cir. 1974) (the USDA Forest Service argued that NEPA establishes two
tests: first they must determine if the action is a major federal action, and
second they must determine if the impacts of the action are significant. The
Court rejected this, saying “[t]o separate the consideration of the magnitude of
federal action from its impact on the environment does little to foster the
purposes of the Act . . . . By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be
possible to speak of a 'minor federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment,' and to hold NEPA inapplicable to such an action. Yet
if the action has a significant effect, it is the intent of NEPA that it should be
the subject of the detailed consideration mandated by NEPA”). But see Hanly v.
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972) (the Court agreed with the defendants
that “major” can refer to the funding and planning involved in a project, and
therefore “major actions” may not always have significant impacts).
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Significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment

CEQ regulations require the word “significantly” to be
interpreted by agencies both in terms of context and intensity.
Because the impacts of the agency actions can differ spatially and
temporally, the regulations require the agency to analyze the
proposed action “in several contexts such as society as a whole . . .
. the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality,” 62 in
order to determine the significance of the impact.
In addition to context, agencies must interpret the
significance of an action through its intensity. CEQ regulations
include ten factors by which the agency may judge the intensity
of the action, including the degree to which the action affects
public health or safety, the degree to which the impacts are likely
to be highly controversial, and the degree to which the action may
establish a precedent for future actions. 63
It could be argued that because a GHG offsets program is
mitigating the impacts of GHG emissions from regulated entities,
and because in many cases these projects could even bring
positive co-benefits, 64 an EIS should not be required. Yet, offsets
projects can have negative co-effects in some cases, such as
reductions in available water quantity. 65 In addition, a project
failure could result in a net increase in atmospheric GHG
concentrations. Regardless, CEQ regulations state that impacts
“may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may
exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the
62. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a).
63. See id. § 1508.27(b).
64. See, e.g., Subhrendu K. Pattanayak et al., Water Quality Co-Effects of
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in US Agriculture, 71 CLIMATIC CHANGE 341, 357
(2005) (finding that carbon sequestration projects could reduce nitrogen loadings
into the Gulf of Mexico). See also Rebecca L. Goldman et al., Field Evidence that
Ecosystem Service Projects Support Biodiversity and Diversify Options, 105
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 9445, 9445 (2008) (finding that ecosystem
service projects, including carbon sequestration projects, can have positive
effects on local biodiversity).
65. See Robert B. Jackson et al., Trading Water for Carbon with Biological
Carbon Sequestration, 310 SCI. 1944, 1944 (2005) (found that planting trees for
carbon sequestration can reduce available water quantity, decreasing stream
flow in some cases).
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effect will be beneficial.” 66 There have been very few court cases
challenging EISs of agency actions with beneficial impacts.
Interestingly, in one such case the court found that CEQ
regulations on beneficial impacts notwithstanding, the lack of
adverse impacts from an action by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission prevented the plaintiffs from demonstrating injury
in fact; therefore, the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. 67
Because the establishment of offsets methodologies could
enable thousands of new projects and shifts in management to
occur on millions of acres of land, it is safe to assume the action of
issuing methodologies would result in significant impacts and
would require the preparation of an EIS. The impacts of
individual projects, however, would clearly differ; some projects
would be as small as a few acres with relatively insignificant
impacts, and some projects would be much larger with more
substantial impacts.
While it is tempting to suggest that smaller projects could
avoid preparing an EIS, it should be noted that the agency
implementing the offsets program must account for the
cumulative effects of its actions. Cumulative effects are defined
in CEQ regulations as impacts resulting from:
the incremental impact of the action when added to other past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future action regardless of
what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such
other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually
minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a
period of time. 68

a. Cumulative Impacts
Because the establishment of offsets methodologies could
enable thousands of individual offsets projects, the cumulative
effect of which could be significant, the agency must account for
those impacts in an EIS. Theoretically, the GHG emissions
66. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1).
67. See Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 457 F.3d
941, 941 (9th Cir. 2006).
68. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
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sequestered or avoided by the project should completely offset any
GHG emissions from other entities allowed by the offset credit, so
there should be no cumulative impact on the overall GHG balance
of the atmosphere. However, individual offsets projects involving
land management, such as tree planting or changes in
agricultural tillage, can have other—beneficial or adverse—
environmental impacts, including changes to water quality and
quantity and wildlife habitat, which may be small for individual
offsets projects but significant when taken together.
When addressing such cumulative impacts, the agency will
not be able to give specific information on projects that have not
yet been developed. For these situations, CEQ regulations
encourage tiering of EISs “to focus on the actual issues ripe for
decision at each level . . .” 69 Therefore, while the agency could
issue a larger programmatic EIS for the entire offsets program, it
might also be required to include site-specific information in a
subsequent EA or EIS for each project.
The courts have been somewhat divided in applying
requirements that EISs account for cumulative impacts. Several
decisions in the Ninth Circuit have struck down EAs or EISs that
omit analysis of site-specific impacts or that improperly tier such
information to a non-NEPA document (such as a management
plan). 70
Although many cumulative impact cases have resulted in the
agency preparing a subsequent site-specific EIS, the opinion in
Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman 71 suggests that this
need not always be the case. Despite striking down the USDA’s
EIS for a program to spray for gypsy moths due to lack of sitespecific information, the court stated: “We do not hold that
federal agencies always must prepare a full and detailed sitespecific EIS . . . . It may be possible to fulfill the requirements of
69. Id. § 1502.20.
70. See, e.g., Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 811
(9th Cir. 1999) (a U.S. Forest Service EIS was ruled inadequate because it tiered
information on cumulative impacts of a timber sale to a forest management
plan, which is a non-NEPA document); Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (two EAs were ruled
inadequate because they did not contain site-specific information about
cumulative impacts of two timber sales).
71. See Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983).
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NEPA with a new [programmatic EIS] that fully discusses the
risks, effects, and benefits” 72 of the proposed action. In a similar
decision in the Fifth Circuit, the court said that “as long as the
agency performs the necessary depth of analysis, the choice
between a programmatic and a site-specific Environmental
Impact Statement is within the agency’s discretion.” 73
Supporting these decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council74 that although an
agency must consider new information that comes to light after it
implements its action, a subsequent EIS is not necessarily
required.
b. Potential model for programmatic EIS
preparation
While the courts have held that a subsequent site-specific
EIS may not always be necessary, the question remains as to
whether the implementing agency will be able to sufficiently
account for the site-specific impacts of many thousands of
individual offsets projects in its programmatic EIS. The cases
mentioned above centered on the failure of agencies to analyze
the cumulative impacts of an action on a relatively limited set of
sites. A better analogy, and a potential model for NEPA
compliance for a federal offsets program, might be drawn from a
larger program with far more individual projects, such as the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 75 administered by the
Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the USDA. The CRP is a
conservation program that offers incentives to farmers and
landowners to implement conservation practices on their land to
provide soil erosion reduction and water quality benefits. The
program has enrolled more than 30 million acres on over 400,000
While the CRP has completed a
farms nationwide. 76
72. Id. at 905.
73. See United States v. 162.20 Acres Of Land, More Or Less, Situated In
Clay County, State Of Miss., 733 F.2d 377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1984).
74. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).
75. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3835 (2006) (for statutory information establishing
the CRP).
76. See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CONSERVATION RESERVE
PROGRAM: SUMMARY AND ENROLLMENT STATISTICS 3 (2008).
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programmatic EIS to analyze the impacts of the overall program,
it is not necessarily required to complete subsequent EAs or EISs
for each project enrolled in the program. FSA regulations state
that:
[i]ndividual farm participation . . . will normally not require any
major involvement with the NEPA process. The practices carried
out under FSA programs that might have impacts on the quality
of the human environment will normally have been discussed in
environmental assessments or impact statements on the
applicable programs. However, for those practices that might
significantly affect the quality of the human environment, the
county committee shall make an environmental evaluation before
approval. If the environmental evaluation shows that the
implementation of a proposed FSA practice on an individual farm
will have significant adverse affects on the quality of the human
environment, the county committee will not approve the practice
implementation until after the completion of the NEPA-EIS
process . . . 77

Although FSA regulations do not require an EA or EIS for
most individual projects, they do provide for the preparation of a
site-specific EA or EIS, if necessary, “for an individually
significant action that is included in a program EIS.” 78 However,
a search for EISs related to the CRP yielded only the
programmatic EIS, suggesting that FSA rarely, if ever, prepares
subsequent site-specific EISs for CRP projects.
In addition, a report by CEQ on accounting for cumulative
impacts states that in cases where few site-specific data are
available, the analyst may use qualitative (rather than
quantitative) evaluation procedures, because “[e]ven when the
analyst cannot quantify cumulative effects, a useful comparison
of relative effects can enable a decisionmaker to choose among
alternatives.” 79

77. 7 C.F.R. § 799.9(d) (2010).
78. Id. § 650.7(d).
79. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 41 (1997), available at
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/ccenepa.htm.
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Therefore, while the implementing agency would likely have
to prepare a programmatic EIS for the entire offsets program, it
is not clear that it would necessarily have to prepare a
subsequent EA or EIS for each offsets project. Although the case
law on NEPA suggests that programmatic EISs are insufficient
for accounting for cumulative impacts of agency actions, 80 the
agency could choose to follow the model of the CRP in preparing a
programmatic EIS and then reserving the right to prepare a
subsequent site-specific EA or EIS for individual projects with
significant impacts, where necessary.
This model offers
something of a compromise in which the implementing agency
could capture most of the benefits of NEPA by formally reviewing
the environmental impacts of larger proposed offsets projects, but
it could also avoid burdening developers of smaller projects with
requirements to prepare an EA or EIS. In doing so, however, the
agency would need to establish a clear threshold relating to a
project’s size or impacts beyond which an EIS would be required.
81

However, given that the preparation of a programmatic EIS
could cause significant delays in the establishment of a GHG
offsets program, and given that there is some uncertainty over
whether EAs and EISs are necessary for individual projects, the
agency may choose to explore exemptions to NEPA. We discuss
these exemptions in the next section.
B. Exemptions to NEPA
Although NEPA is meant to include “to the fullest extent
possible . . . all agencies of the Federal Government,” 82 many
agency actions are exempt from its requirements. The clearest
example of this is actions that are exempt from NEPA by statute.
80. See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 177 F.3d at 810.
81. One potential model the implementing agency could follow is that of the
Gold Standard, a nonprofit organization that has developed methodologies for
the certification of voluntary and compliance-grade carbon offset credits. The
Gold Standard methodologies include a matrix in which environmental, social,
and economic aspects of the proposed projects are scored. Projects receiving
negative scores must prepare an environmental impact assessment See THE
GOLD STANDARD, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
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As mentioned above, all actions taken under the CAA are not
subject to NEPA, 83 which means that an offsets program
implemented under the CAA would be exempt from NEPA.
Nevertheless, there are several other exemptions that an
implementing agency may be able to employ to avoid NEPA
requirements for its offsets program if its program is not
specifically exempt pursuant to the CAA or another statute.
Most of these exemptions have evolved from NEPA’s long and
complex case history, particularly from cases in which agencies
have sought to avoid completing an EIS. However, an agency’s
ability to use these exemptions is generally decided by the courts,
which, like the preparation of an EIS itself, could lead to delays
in the establishment of an offsets program. Furthermore, it
should be noted that the circuits have differed in their
interpretations of NEPA’s applicability, resulting in differences in
the applications of many of these exemptions.
1.

Categorical exclusions

CEQ regulations allow agencies to establish procedures to
identify categorical exclusions, which are actions that have been
pre-determined by the agency to have no significant impact on
the quality of the human environment. 84 These exclusions are
generally reserved for routine actions, such as administrative
functions, budget proposals, and educational or informational
activities, and agencies must develop them under consultation
The
with CEQ and publish them for public comment. 85
86
categorical exclusions established by both the EPA and USDA 87
do not include any language that would automatically exempt a
GHG offsets program from compliance with NEPA. While either
agency could establish new categorical exclusions for an offsets
program, they would likely be precluded from doing so for an
offsets program or offsets projects because of requirements that
such exclusions be limited to actions with no individual or
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1).
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
Id. § 1507.3(b).
Id. § 6.204.
See 7 C.F.R. § 1b.3.
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cumulative impacts, 88 and as discussed above, both the issuance
of offsets methodologies and the approval of individual projects
have significant cumulative impacts.
2.

Lack of agency discretion

Another possible exemption from preparing an EIS involves
situations in which a statute’s requirements are so specific that
the agency lacks any discretion over the action. In such a case an
EIS would be unnecessary, because the purpose of the EIS is to
inform the agency’s decision-making process. If the agency has
no choice but to perform the action in a specific manner as
described by statute, the agency would have no use for the EIS.
An important example of this lack of agency discretion
involves the decision by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
on whether to list a species as threatened or endangered under
the Endangered Species Act. In making that decision, the FWS is
limited to considering only the five factors laid out in the statute,
including the threats to a species’ habitat or range and the
adequacy of existing regulatory measures. 89 In a case before the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 90 FWS argued that the
statute leaves no room for it to consider the environmental
impacts of their decision to list the species. The court held that
because of the resulting statutory conflict between NEPA and the
ESA, FWS was not required to prepare an EIS since the analysis
presented in the EIS could have no influence on its actions. 91
Under the bills before the 111th Congress, neither the EPA
nor USDA would likely be able to claim exemption from NEPA for
its offsets program under the first type of statutory bypass, in
88. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 .
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). The other factors for consideration in listing a
species include the overutilization of the species for commercial, recreational,
scientific, or educational purposes; disease or predation; and other natural or
manmade factors affecting its continued existence.
90. Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 1981).
91. A similar decision in Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp.
Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2001) found that the National Trails System
Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2006)) directed the actions of the Surface
Transportation Board so specifically that an EIS was not required for its
decision to authorize a rail right-of-way to be used as a trail, because “the
information that NEPA provides can have no affect on the agency's actions.”
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which the agency lacks sufficient discretion over the proposed
action.
Although both ACES and the APA give specific
instructions to the EPA and USDA concerning the establishment
of the offsets program and approval of offsets projects, the
instructions are not so rigid as to completely remove the agencies’
discretion in promulgating regulations. For example, ACES
requires the USDA to establish methodologies for domestic
agricultural and forestry practices that are eligible to supply
offsets, but only “if the Secretary determines that methodologies
can be established for such practices that meet each of the
requirements of this section.” 92 Because the agency has the
discretion to determine whether or not offsets methodologies can
even be established, its decision to establish and approve those
methodologies could potentially benefit from the information
provided in an EIS.
3.

Statutory bypass

Somewhat similar to the exemption based on lack of agency
discretion, an agency can claim an exemption from NEPA if its
requirements under an existing statute conflict with its
requirements under NEPA. This includes situations in which the
time required to complete an EIS exceeds the time limit for the
agency’s compliance with its obligations under the other statute.
This exemption was determined in Flint Ridge Development
Company v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma, 93 which was
argued before the Supreme Court in 1976. The case centered
around the approval by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) of a statement of record by a developer with
information on the nature of a subdivision development. HUD
declined to prepare an EIS to analyze the environmental impacts
of this decision because it was required by the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act to approve the statement of record
within 30 days. 94 The Court agreed that this constraint did not
give HUD enough time to complete an EIS, and in so doing, they
92. H.R. 2454 § 504.
93. See generally, Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426
U.S. 776 (1976).
94. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1706 (2006).
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set up a broad exemption, holding that “where a clear and
unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must
give way.” 95
It is not immediately clear whether the implementing agency
could claim exemption from NEPA under this type of statutory
bypass. ACES and the APA include a series of strict statutory
deadlines for the establishment of the offsets program and the
approval of offsets projects, each of which the agency may be
unable to meet if they have to prepare an EIS.
ACES requires the EPA to establish an offsets program for
domestic sources, including the issuance of offsets project
methodologies, within two years of enactment of the bill. 96 It also
requires the USDA to establish a program for offsets from
domestic agricultural and forestry sources, including the issuance
of methodologies, within one year of enactment. 97 The APA
combines both the EPA and USDA offsets programs and requires
the establishment of the program and issuance of methodologies
within 18 months. 98
The preparation of an EIS—especially a programmatic EIS—
can take more than a year to complete, and the preparation of an
EA can take several months. 99 Since a final EIS or FONSI must
be complete before the agency would be able to establish the
offsets program, 100 the agency may be unable to meet the
requirements of both the climate regulation statue and NEPA,
and therefore, it may be able argue that this provides an
exemption from the NEPA process. However, given how narrowly
the courts have interpreted statutory bypass exemptions, 101 it is

95. Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 777 (1976).
96. H.R. 2454 §§ 732(a), 733.
97. Id. §§ 502(a), 503(a)(1).
98. APA § 733.
99. NEPA’s Forty Most Asked Questions, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/40/40p3.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
100. See Calverton Cliffs Coordinating Comm, 449 F.2d at 1129 (stating that
an EIS must be completed before the agency implements the proposed action).
101. See e.g. Forelaws on Bd. v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the Bonneville Power Administration was not allowed to claim a
statutory bypass exempting it from preparing an EIS, because the statutory
conflict arose only from an “excessively narrow construction of its existing
statutory authorizations . . .”) (quoting H.R. Rep. 39702-703 (1969) (Conf. Rep.).
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not at all clear that such an argument would successfully prevent
the agency from having to prepare an EIS before approving
offsets methodologies.
The timeline for the approval of individual offsets projects is
much shorter as compared to the issuance of methodologies.
Under ACES, the EPA or USDA must approve or deny an offsets
project within 90 days of receiving an offsets project plan from a
project developer, 102 it must certify the project’s offset credits
within 90 days of receiving a required report about the project
from a third-party verifier, 103 and it must issue the credits to the
project within 14 days of certification. 104 The length of time
provided by these requirements may not even be sufficient to
prepare a brief EA, let alone a complete EIS, suggesting that the
case may be stronger for statutory bypass of NEPA requirements
calling for the approval of individual projects.
4.

Functional equivalence exemption

The purpose of NEPA is to require agencies to “take a hard
look” 105 at the environmental impacts of their proposed actions by
considering all relevant alternatives in an EIS. However, the
courts have found that, in some cases, agency requirements under
other environmental statutes serve the same function as NEPA,
and so the preparation of an EIS is seen as redundant. Such
functional equivalence exemptions have most often been applied
to actions taken by the EPA. 106 Indeed, one judicial opinion
states of the EPA: “. . . we see little need in requiring a NEPA
statement from an agency whose raison d’être is the protection of
102. H.R. 2454 § 506(c).
103. Id. § 507(a).
104. Id. § 507(d).
105. See Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 443
(4th.Cir. 1996).
106. See Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116, 122 (D. Md. 1976) (EPA is
exempt from NEPA for actions taken under the Ocean Dumping Act); Merrell v.
Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986) (EPA is exempt from NEPA for
actions taken under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act);
Alabama v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990) (EPA is exempt from NEPA
for actions taken under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); and W.
Neb. Res. Council v. EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 870 (8th Cir. 1991) (EPA is exempt
from NEPA for actions taken under the Safe Drinking Water Act).
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the environment.” 107
This could suggest that the EPA is
completely exempt from NEPA requirements; however, there are
still cases in which the EPA must prepare an EIS to comply with
NEPA, 108 such as certain actions taken under the Clean Water
Act. 109
A similar exemption has been granted to the FWS in its
actions under the ESA in a pair of decisions decided by the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus 110 and
Douglas County v. Babbitt 111 both found that the action by the
FWS of adding a species to the endangered species list, “furthers
the purposes of NEPA even though no impact statement is
filed.” 112 In Pacific Legal Foundation the court stated that
because FWS “is working to preserve the environment and
prevent the irretrievable loss of a natural resource,” 113 it should
be exempt from NEPA requirements.
From these decisions, it may appear that any agency action
that protects the environment should be exempt from NEPA
under the functional equivalence doctrine. However, a decision in
the D.C. Circuit made clear that there is no “broad exemption
from NEPA for all environmental agencies or even for all
environmentally protective regulatory actions of such
agencies.” 114 Similarly, the exemption for FWS from NEPA in
listing a species established by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits was
not maintained in a decision in the Tenth Circuit, which found
107. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650, (D.C. Cir. 1973).
108. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.100-6.103 (2010) (for the EPA regulations on complying
with NEPA). See also Notice of Policy and Procedures for Voluntary Preparation
of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Documents, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,045
(Oct. 29, 1998) (for a statement of policy by the EPA concerning the voluntary
preparation of EAs and EISs where they are not legally required, but where
they would increase public involvement and understanding of the process, and
where they would aid in analysis of large-scale ecological impacts, particularly
cumulative effects).
109. These include the issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits under CWA § 402 and the award of wastewater
treatment construction grants under Title II.
110. Pac. Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 837.
111. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995).
112. Pac. Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 837.
113. Id.
114. Envtl. Def. Fund Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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that “[p]artial fulfillment of NEPA’s requirements . . . is not
enough” to warrant an exemption from preparing an EIS. 115
This split among circuits as to the application of functional
equivalence exemptions suggests that the implementing agency
might have difficulty in successfully arguing that its offsets
program is functionally equivalent to NEPA. The functional
equivalence exemptions carved out by the courts have been for
actions that are environmentally protective and specifically by
agencies “solely charged with protecting the environment.”116
However, the actions of implementing an offsets program, issuing
methodologies, and approving projects are not necessarily
environmentally protective. Although ACES and the APA require
certain environmental considerations for forestry and other land
management offset practices, including a preference for native
species and practices that encourage the conservation of
biological diversity, 117 and although there may be some positive
co-benefits from certain land use projects in the form of improved
water quality and biodiversity habitat, 118 there could also be
negative co-effects, such as reduced water supply. 119
Furthermore, beyond the impacts of the projects themselves,
offset credits generated by the project allow regulated entities to
emit more GHGs. In fact, a properly executed carbon offsets
project should have no effect whatsoever on the environment in
terms of the atmospheric GHG balance; for each ton of CO 2
sequestered by a project, another ton will be emitted by a
regulated entity.
For these reasons, it is not entirely clear whether the action
by the USDA of establishing an offsets program or approving
offsets projects would be viewed by the courts as sufficiently
protective of the environment to be deemed functionally
equivalent to NEPA.

115. Catron Cnty. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th
Cir. 1996).
116. Pac. Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 837.
117. H.R. 2454 § 510; APA § 735(h).
118. See PATTANAYAK, ET AL., supra note 64.
119. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 65.
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C. Discussion
The establishment of an offsets program and the approval of
individual projects could be considered a major federal action
with cumulatively significant impacts to the quality of the human
environment. Therefore, NEPA would likely apply to a federal
GHG offsets program. However, it could be argued that the
requirements to report on the potential impacts of the offsets
program could largely be confined to the establishment of the
program and the issuance of methodologies.
Although the approval of individual projects would also be
considered a federal action, and although the projects would have
cumulatively significant impacts, the project approval process
would not necessarily be substantially affected by NEPA. In
approving projects, the implementing agency could choose to
promulgate regulations allowing it to use its discretion in
determining which projects are either sufficiently large or would
have a significant enough impact as to require an EA or EIS,
similar to how the Farm Service Agency administers contracts for
the Conservation Reserve Program.
A long history of NEPA litigation has produced several
exemptions from its requirements, though none of these
exemptions appear to apply to the establishment of an offsets
program and issuance of offsets methodologies under the GHG
regulation proposals considered by the 111th Congress. However,
one of these exemptions may apply to the approval of projects, as
the proposed legislation gives a strict 90-day timeline for
approval or denial of projects, which is not enough time to
complete an EA or EIS.
For these reasons, it appears that the agency implementing
the offsets program would likely be required to prepare a
programmatic EIS for the entire program, including its
methodologies; however, it may not need to prepare subsequent
EISs for individual projects, unless it deems the project as having
particularly significant environmental impacts. This allows the
agency to take advantage of the analysis provided in NEPA
documents to determine the environmental effects of larger
projects, while avoiding placing onerous reporting requirements
on smaller projects.
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IV. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 contains wide-ranging
provisions to protect threatened and endangered species, with
implications for the actions of both private individuals and
federal agencies. Under the ESA, the US Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) (hereinafter, collectively or individually, “the Service” or
“the Secretary”) must establish a list of species that are
threatened or endangered with extinction, as well as habitats
that are critical to the survival of such species. 120
Unlike NEPA, the ESA includes both substantive and
procedural requirements. Whereas NEPA requires agencies only
to report on and consider the environmental impacts caused by
their actions, section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species. 121

This provision establishes two requirements that could
potentially affect the implementation of an offsets program.
First, an agency must consult with the Secretary of the Interior
or the Secretary of Commerce before approving any action that
may impact any listed species or its critical habitat. Second, an
agency must ensure that its action will not jeopardize the
continued existence of such species or its habitat. Each of these
requirements is discussed in turn.
A. Requirements of the Endangered Species Act
1.

Consultation with the Secretary of the Interior or

120. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006). In general, the US Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS) has jurisdiction over terrestrial species, and the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) has jurisdiction over marine species.
121. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
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Secretary of Commerce
Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies to consult with
either the Secretary of Interior or Commerce before approving,
funding, or permitting any action that may impact an endangered
or threatened species or its habitat. The agency must complete
the consultation before it, or any permit or license applicant,
makes “any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources
with respect to the agency action.” 122
The USFWS and NMFS have established regulations guiding
agencies through the process of what has become known as
“section 7 consultation.” 123 Agencies can choose to initiate an
informal consultation, which includes informal discussions
If the informal
between the agency and the Service. 124
consultation determines that the action is not likely to adversely
affect a listed species or its critical habitat, then the agency has
fully satisfied its requirements under section 7 of the ESA, and it
may implement the action. 125 Approximately 90-95% of section 7
consultations are completed informally, resulting in little or no
project delay or modification. 126
Alternatively, the agency can prepare a biological assessment
to evaluate the potential impacts of the action on listed species
and critical habitats. 127 A biological assessment includes (1) the
results of an on-site inspection of the project area to determine if
listed species are present, (2) discussions with experts on the
relevant species, (3) a review of the literature, (4) analysis of
cumulative effects of the project, and (5) an analysis of any
Similar to
alternate actions considered by the agency. 128
122. Id. § 1536(d).
123. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-402.16 (2010).
124. Id. § 402.13(a).
125. Id.
126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND
NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 30 (1992). See also Oliver A. Houck,
Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 689, 692 (1995) (citing
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS CHEAPER THAN
WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3-4
(1994)).
127. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (requiring biological assessments for major
construction activities).
128. Id. § 402.12(f).
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informal consultation, if the biological assessment indicates that
the action is not likely to adversely affect a listed species, then
the agency may proceed with the action without a formal
consultation. 129
If, however, informal consultation or the biological
assessment indicates that the action is likely to have an impact
on a listed species or its habitat, the agency must initiate formal
The formal consultation
consultation with the Service. 130
requires the agency to provide the Service with the best available
scientific and commercial data concerning the action. The Service
will then use that data and any other relevant information, which
may include an on-site inspection of the action area, to formulate
a biological opinion “as to whether the action, taken together with
cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence
of listed species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat.” 131 The vast majority of the time,
formal consultation results in a “no jeopardy” opinion. 132 The
Service must include reasonable and prudent alternatives in the
biological assessment if there is a jeopardy finding. Even in the
absence of a jeopardy finding, the Service may suggest
alternatives to the action and conservation recommendations. In
general, the formal consultation process will not last more than
90 days. 133
The Courts have been quite clear on the importance of the
consultation requirement, and several cases have resulted in
injunctions of agency actions for failure to properly consult with
the FWS or NMFS. 134
129. Id. § 402.12(k).
130. Id. § 402.14(a).
131. Id. § 402.14(g)(4).
132. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 126, at 15; Houck, supra
note 126, at 692.
133. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e).
134. See Lane Cnty. Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir.
1992) (enjoining the Bureau of Land Management from completing timber sales
under the guidance of a management strategy meant to protect the listed
northern spotted owl, because the management strategy was never submitted to
the Service for consultation); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1057
(9th Cir. 1994) (enjoining the U.S. Forest Service from management activities in
the Wallowa-Whitman and Umatilla National Forests until its Land and
Resource Management Plans were submitted to NMFS for consultation); Wash.
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Furthermore, even when an agency properly initiates
consultation with the Service, the consultation process itself can
be called into question. However, the Courts have generally
limited such challenges to the consultation process, holding that
the adequacy of the consultation can only be questioned if its
conclusions are arbitrary or capricious. 135
The outcome of the consultation process is used to judge
whether the agency has satisfied its other requirement under
section 7, which is to ensure that its actions will not jeopardize
the continued existence of a listed species or its critical habitat.
2.

The obligation to prevent jeopardy to listed
species

In addition to requiring agencies to consult with the Service
over any proposed action that may affect a listed species, the Act
requires the agency to ensure that its actions are not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of its critical habitat. 136
This requirement has been the subject of extensive litigation,
especially because it is not immediately clear from the text of the
statute who has the responsibility to determine whether or not
the agency has satisfied this requirement—the action agency
itself or the Service.
In an early case in the Fifth Circuit, which is still often cited
in opinions about the ESA, the court held that agencies needed
only to consult with the Service and that “once an agency has had
meaningful consultation with the Secretary of Interior concerning
actions which may affect an endangered species the final decision
of whether or not to proceed with the action lies with the agency

Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (enjoining the EPA
from approving certain pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) because it failed to first consult with NMFS over
possible effects on listed salmon).
135. See Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1320 (10th Cir.
2007). See also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378
F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (overturning a biological opinion issued by the
FWS because it used an improper definition for adverse habitat modification).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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itself.” 137 A similar decision in the Eighth Circuit in the same
year found that “[c]onsultation under Section 7 does not require
acquiescence. Should a difference of opinion arise as to a given
project, the responsibility for decision after consultation is not
vested in the Secretary but in the agency involved.” 138
However, two years after these cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided perhaps the most well known ESA case, Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill. 139 In this case, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) was blocked from closing the dam gates on the
all-but-completed Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project, a project on
which Congress had already spent more than $100 million,
because doing so would almost certainly wipe out the only known
population of the snail darter, a three-inch fish and federally
listed species. In its opinion, the court stated that section 7 of the
ESA “admits of no exception,” and that “Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.” 140
Therefore this case strongly suggests that federal agencies’ duties
go beyond simply having “meaningful consultation” with the
Service, 141 and that each agency action must truly be judged on
whether or not it will jeopardize the continued existence of a
listed species or result in the destruction of its critical habitat. 142

137. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976).
138. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976).
139. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
140. Id. at 173-74.
141. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 529 F.2d at 371.
142. This decision was fiercely criticized by many members of Congress,
including supporters of the original ESA in 1973. This resulted in an
amendment to the ESA that Congress passed in 1978, establishing the
Endangered Species Committee, which had the authority to grant exemptions
from the ESA for certain projects. See generally Nancy M. Ganong, Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1978: A Congressional Response to Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (1979). The Endangered Species
Committee grants exemptions from Section 7 requirements only after
determining that there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives, the benefits
clearly outweigh the costs, the action is of national or regional significance, and
reasonable mitigation measures have been established. The committee voted
unanimously to deny the Tellico Dam Project an exemption from the ESA. The
project was eventually completed, however, after Rep. John Duncan attached a
rider to the annual public works appropriation bill in 1979, which exempted the
project from the ESA. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency
Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747, 783 (1982).
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Subsequent cases have clarified, however, that the action
agency, and not the Service, retains the final authority to
determine whether it has complied with its responsibility under
section 7(a)(2), provided it is using the best available scientific
Any challenges to such agency
and commercial data. 143
determinations must show that they were arbitrary and
capricious. 144 Therefore, although an agency must demonstrate
that it has complied with its requirements under section 7, it is
generally given deference to make the determination for itself
that the requirements have been satisfied.
B. Impacts of the ESA on a Federal GHG Offsets Program
With the ESA, Congress sought to protect threatened and
endangered species, and prevent their extinction.
The
requirements of the statute are wide-ranging and can affect many
agency actions, including, potentially, a federal GHG offsets
program. In order to comply with the letter and intent of the law,
the agency implementing the offsets program will need to balance
its critical duty to protect listed species and their habitat with its
obligations to establish and administer the offsets program.

143. See Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049
(1st Cir. 1982) (holding that an agency action that receives a jeopardy opinion
can move forward once it has completed all “practicable” scientific studies); Stop
H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1460 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Federal
Highway Administration “cannot abrogate its responsibility [to the Service] to
decide whether it has taken all possible action” to protect listed species);
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442) (“A federal agency cannot
abrogate its responsibility to ensure that its actions will not jeopardize a listed
species; its decision to rely on a FWS biological opinion must not have been
arbitrary or capricious . . . Nonetheless, even when the FWS's opinion is based
on ‘admittedly weak’ information, another agency's reliance on that opinion will
satisfy its obligations under the Act . . .”). But see N. M. ex rel. Bill Richardson v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 700 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Despite the name,
consultation is more than a mere procedural requirement, as it allows FWS to
impose substantive constraints on the other agency's action if necessary to limit
the impact upon an endangered species.”).
144. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (enjoining a
project by the US Army Corps of Engineers, because its decision not to reinitiate
consultation with USFWS after the issuance of a jeopardy opinion was found to
be arbitrary and capricious).
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Similar to the impacts of NEPA on a federal GHG offsets
program, consultations with the Service under the ESA could
lead to significant delays in the establishment of the offsets
program and the issuance of offsets methodologies. The ESA
requires agencies to fully satisfy their obligations under section
7(a)(2) before committing resources to show that their actions are
not likely to jeopardize any listed species or destroy their critical
habitat. 145 This means that all informal and formal consultations
would have to occur before the implementing agency could
establish the program, issue methodologies, or approve individual
projects.
While such consultations could lead to delays if they are
required before the establishment of the offsets program, they
could be even more disruptive if they are required before the
approval of individual projects. Like NEPA, delays in project
approval could increase transaction costs and discourage
landowner participation in the market, decreasing overall supply
of offset credits and increasing the costs of complying with GHG
regulations. However, landowners can also have a much more
negative view of the ESA requirements than NEPA requirements.
Because the ESA can lead to restrictions of land management on
private land, landowners have incentives to discourage listed
species from taking residence on their land. 146 Furthermore,
studies have found that landowners often do not give permission
to government agencies to survey for listed species on their
property. 147 For these reasons, a requirement to consult with the
Service, which in certain cases may include a visit to the
landowner’s property to inspect for the presence of a listed
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.09.
146. See Dean Lueck & Jeffery A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction
Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J. L. & ECON. 27, 30 (2003) (finding that
the closer a property is to known locations of endangered red-cockaded
woodpeckers, the more likely the property is to be harvested, often at a younger
than optimum age).
147. See Amara Brook, Michaela Zint, & Raymond de Young, Landowners’
Responses to an Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for
Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638, 1643 (2003)
(finding that 56% of survey respondents had not given or would not give
permission to allow a biological survey for endangered Preble’s meadow jumping
mice; 14% of respondents said they managed their land to minimize the chance
of the species living on it).
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species, 148 could discourage landowners from participating in the
carbon market. 149
However, it is not clear whether consultation with the
Service would be required before the approval of individual
projects. If it were required, it seems likely that in the vast
majority of cases, the consultation could be conducted informally,
with minimal or no direct involvement by the landowner.
Nevertheless, there are several steps an agency can take to
streamline compliance with the ESA, in order to minimize
disruption to agency actions, while still ensuring protection of
listed species. These steps are discussed below.
C. Options for complying with the ESA’s consultation
requirements in approving offsets projects
1.

Internal agency review

The most straightforward option for streamlining the
consultation process is for the agency itself to screen out permit
applications that are obviously not likely to adversely affect a
listed species. The ESA regulations on consultations state that
“[e]ach Federal agency shall review its actions . . . to determine
whether any action may affect listed species or critical
Therefore, the agency itself would have the
habitat.” 150
discretion to determine whether its proposed action would result
in impacts to listed species or critical habitat.
This model is followed by the Corps of Engineers in their
approval of wetland mitigation permits under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act. 151 Corps regulations state that if the district
engineer determines that the mitigation project will not impact a
listed species or its habitat, then consultation with the Service is
not necessary. 152 If the district engineer determines that the

148. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(1).
149. However, given sufficiently high payments for GHG offset credits, some
landowners may choose to accept risks of ESA regulation of their land.
150. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).
151. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
152. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b)(5) (2010).
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project may impact a listed species, then the Corps will initiate
formal consultation. 153
The implementing agency could follow a similar model in
approving projects under an offsets program. The agency would
need only to consult with the Service on a small minority of
projects that may affect listed species.
For some more complex actions, however, the agency may not
have the expertise to determine on its own whether the proposed
action may affect a listed species. Furthermore, using only its
discretion to decide whether consultation is necessary, rather
than a formal decision-making framework, could leave the agency
vulnerable to lawsuits from citizens second-guessing its decisions.
Therefore, there are at least two other options in which a more
formal arrangement between the agency and the Service can be
arranged to help guide agency actions through the Section 7
consultation requirements. Both are discussed below.
2.

Programmatic biological assessments

Although the ESA regulations give agencies the discretion to
determine whether or not consultation with the Service is
necessary, some agencies go ahead and prepare a biological
assessment to cover programs that may have impacts on listed
species.
Similar to a programmatic EIS under NEPA, a
programmatic biological assessment refers to a single document
covering a large program, which may have many individual
projects. These programmatic biological assessments can be
written so that common project types are exempt from
consultation.
The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)
administers several conservation incentive programs, including
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), each of which can have
hundreds or thousands of individual projects. Because section 7
consultation with the Service for each project could be
impractical, NRCS, in some cases, prepares a single biological
assessment to cover all of its programs within a state.
153. Id.
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For example, the programmatic biological assessment for the
state of Montana establishes a screen in which relatively simple,
straightforward projects receive a determination that an action is
“not likely to adversely affect” a listed species. 154 More complex
projects must still go through standard consultation. Each year,
the Service audits a subset of projects to determine if the screen
is being applied properly.
The programmatic biological assessment has the advantage
of formalizing the agency’s process for deciding whether to
consult with the Service. If the agency implementing the offsets
program determines that a specific offsets project type, such as
reduced agricultural tillage, is unlikely to impact listed species, it
can make that clear in its biological assessment. Through the
biological assessment, the agency can seek preemptive approval
of its decision-making process from the Service to avoid later
legal action.
3.

Counterpart regulations

In an even more formal approach to addressing consultation
requirements for large-scale programs, the ESA regulations allow
for the establishment of “counterpart regulations” specific to the
needs of the program. 155 Thus far, such regulations have been
established for only two programs: the National Fire Plan 156 and
actions by the EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 157

154. See Programmatic Biological Assessment Overview, NAT. RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC, http://www.mt.nrcs.usda.gov/
technical/ecs/biology/programmatic.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
155. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (“The consultation procedures set forth in this part
may be superseded for a particular Federal agency by joint counterpart
regulations among that agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National
Marine Fisheries Service.”).
156. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.30-402.34 (providing counterpart regulations
concerning consultations under the National Fire Plan). See also Joint
Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 68
Fed. Reg. 68,254 (Dec. 8, 2003).
157. See id. §§ 402.40-402.49 (providing counterpart regulations concerning
consultations under FIFRA). See also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2006) (for the text of
FIFRA).
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The National Fire Plan is a collection of documents governing
federal wildfire policy, including the Healthy Forests Restoration
Act (HFRA), passed by Congress in 2003. 158 Part of the Act
includes the Healthy Forests Reserve Program, which, among
other things, provides incentives to landowners to restore
habitats of federally listed species. 159 Because these projects will
necessarily affect listed species and their habitats, it follows that
they would require consultation with the Service. In order to
streamline the review process, however, counterpart regulations
were established to “eliminate the need . . . to conduct informal
In these counterpart regulations, staff of
consultation.” 160
various federal land management agencies, including the U.S.
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management, receive training
by the Service to make determinations about projects that are not
likely to adversely affect listed species. 161
The agency implementing the offsets program may choose to
establish similar counterpart regulations with the Service, if it
predicts that the administration of section 7 consultations would
be excessively burdensome. Such counterpart regulations are
still subject to normal notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act, 162 which
could delay the initial establishment of the offsets program, but
may also simplify its overall administration by reducing the need
to consult authorities outside of the agency on ESA-related
issues.
D. Issues concerning jeopardy determinations in offsets
projects
Section 7 not only requires that agencies consult with the
Service regarding proposed actions, but also requires that
agencies ensure that their actions will not jeopardize the
continued existence of listed species or their critical habitats. If,
158. See Healthy Forests Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6591 (2006).
159. See id. § 6574.
160. Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation
Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 68,255.
161. 50 C.F.R. § 402.33.
162. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
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after a consultation, the Service issues a jeopardy determination
to an agency for its action, it can be difficult for the agency to
justify that action as fully complying with section 7. Therefore, in
administering an offsets program, the implementing agency could
face (admittedly rare) 163 situations in which a project would have
to be denied—not for reasons concerning the regulations of the
offsets program—but because the project would run afoul of the
Nevertheless,
jeopardy requirement of the ESA. 164
notwithstanding Chief Justice Warren Burger’s claim that section
7 “admits of no exception,” 165 there are certain exemptions that
have evolved over the years that allow agency actions to move
forward even under a jeopardy determination.
1.

The Endangered Species Committee

In the aftermath of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, in
which a nearly completed multimillion dollar dam project on the
Little Tennessee River was halted to preserve the snail darter,
Congress amended the ESA to create the Endangered Species
Committee, 166 which has the authority to exempt an agency from
section 7 regulation. In effect, the committee has the authority to
allow an extinction of a species, earning them the nickname “the
God Squad.” 167 In practice, however, the committee has only met
six times from 1978 through 2007, granting a full exemption in

163. Analysis of nearly 100,000 section 7 consultations over a five-year period
in the 1990s found only 54 projects terminated due to jeopardy determinations,
or 0.054 percent of all consultations. See Houck, supra note 126, at 692.
164. However, in issuing a jeopardy opinion, the Service must also provide any
reasonable and prudent alternatives. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3). It is possible
that an offsets project could still move forward employing one of these
alternatives.
165. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 173.
166. The Endangered Species Committee is comprised of the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the EPA, the Secretary of the Interior,
the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
and one individual appointed by the President from each affected state. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3).
167. See generally Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process Under the
Endangered Species Act: How the “God Squad” Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 825 (1991).
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one case, and a partial exemption in another case; all other cases
were either denied exemptions or withdrawn. 168
This approach does not seem to be a promising option for
offsets projects with the potential to jeopardize listed species or
destroy critical habitats. First, applications for exemptions and
approvals by the committee are exceedingly rare. Second, the
committee must find that “there are no reasonable and prudent
alternatives to the agency action.” 169
Offsets are not required by any proposed legislation; they are
simply another option for complying with regulations that can
reduce the overall cost of compliance. Furthermore, the number
of offsets projects that would receive a jeopardy determination is
likely to be extremely small. Therefore, there will likely be plenty
of alternatives, not only for compliance with GHG regulations,
but also for purchasing offsets. This makes it highly unlikely
that the committee would grant an exemption from section 7.
2.

Incidental take permits

Section 9 of the ESA prohibits any individual from “taking”
any listed species, 170 which includes direct harm to or
harassment of species, 171 or adverse habitat modification. 172
However, Section 10 of the Act allows the Secretary to grant a
permit to an individual to take a listed species, “if such taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.” 173
These permits, known as “incidental take permits,” require
landowners to develop habitat conservation plans, which include
steps that the landowner will take to minimize and mitigate

168. M. LYNN CORN, EUGENE H. BUCK, & PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 31659, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A PRIMER 25-26 (2006).
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(A).
170. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
171. Id. § 1532(19).
172. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S.
687, 698-99 (1995) (finding that the definition of “take” encompasses adverse
habitat modification, as long as there is a showing of actual injury to a member
of a listed species).
173. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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impacts to listed species. 174 Generally, the Service requires that
permittees mitigate impacts by restoring or creating habitat for
the listed species that are affected. This requirement has driven
the conservation banking market, in which banks restore or
create habitats for listed species and sell the credits to developers
or other applicants for incidental take permits. 175 However, such
credits can be extremely expensive; one study estimated the
average credit price at more than $31,000 per acre. 176 It is
unlikely that any offsets project would be economical if faced with
such prices for conservation banking credits. Therefore, section
10 of the ESA might not offer much help to landowners interested
in participating in the carbon market when faced with listed
species on their land.
3.

Lack of discretion

The ESA also grants an exemption for agency actions that
are nondiscretionary. 177 However, as discussed in the section on
NEPA, above, the proposals for climate legislation before the
111th Congress give the USDA and EPA plenty of discretion in
establishing an offsets program and approving individual
projects. Therefore, this exemption would likely not apply to a
federal GHG offsets program.
E. Discussion
In general, as with NEPA, the requirements of the ESA
would almost certainly apply to a federal GHG offsets program.
The impact on the administration of the program would largely
be confined to the program’s establishment, and not extend to the
approval of individual projects.
174. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
175. See BECCA MADSEN, NATHANIEL CARROLL, & KELLY MOORE BRANDS,
ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY MARKETS REPORT: OFFSET AND
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE 15 (2010).
176. Id at 17.
177. See Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644,
681 (2007) (holding that ESA applies only to discretionary actions). See also 50
C.F.R. § 402.03 (“Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions
in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”) (emphasis
added).
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Section 7 of the ESA creates two requirements for federal
agencies: they must consult with the Service over their planned
action, and they must ensure that their action is not likely to
jeopardize listed species. In order to comply with Section 7 in
establishing an offsets program, the implementing agency would
almost certainly need to consult with the Service to ensure that
the administration of the program will not result in jeopardy for
listed species. Nevertheless, the agency has several options to
minimize the impacts of consultations on individual projects. It
could use its own discretion over which projects require
consultation, similar to how the Corps addresses the issue in
approving wetland mitigation permits; it could prepare a
programmatic biological assessment that clarifies which projects
require consultation; or it could, together with the Service, issue
counterpart regulations that allow the agency to perform its own
Section 7 consultations.
Once the consultation procedures for the offsets program
have been established, the USDA or EPA will also need to
demonstrate that the program and its individual projects will not
jeopardize listed species or destroy critical habitat. The jeopardy
requirement would not, however, affect the vast majority of
projects. For the few projects that might receive jeopardy
determinations, there are potential exemptions to the
requirement, but the exemptions would likely either not apply to
offsets projects or would be too expensive to implement.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Both NEPA and the ESA could significantly impact the
establishment and administration of a federal GHG offsets
program. However, in both cases, the impacts could potentially
be limited to the initial establishment of the program and the
issuance of offsets project methodologies, but not necessarily to
the approval of individual projects. To comply with NEPA, the
agency implementing the offsets program will almost certainly
need to prepare a programmatic EA or EIS. Most individual
projects, however, would not necessarily need to complete a
subsequent environmental analysis, unless it is an especially
large project with significant impacts.
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Similarly, to comply with the ESA, the implementing agency
would need to consult, either formally or informally, with the
Service, regarding the establishment of the program; individual
projects would likely be able to forego subsequent consultation,
unless there is a chance that listed species would be affected.
ESA regulations offer several options to ensure agency
procedures will not conflict with requirements of Section 7,
including the establishment of counterpart regulations to
streamline the consultation process.
Experience with other national large-scale land use
programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program, the
Healthy Forests Reserve Program, and the wetlands mitigation
program administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
suggests that the administration by the federal government of
thousands of contracts with individual landowners can proceed
smoothly while still fully complying with existing environmental
statutes like NEPA and the ESA. Nevertheless, the rich history
of litigation surrounding both statutes implies that the
administrator of an offsets program could well expect to face legal
challenges despite the implementing agency’s best efforts to
comply with existing environmental law. Yet, the variety of
exemptions generated by litigation over NEPA and the ESA also
suggests that such challenges would not necessarily endanger the
program or its administration.
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